

## **Free Speech in American Universities: Why the Elite Institutions Are Failing Most Often**

### **Abstract**

This paper aims to answer why elite universities tend to score worse on free speech. Using ranking scores that claim to assess universities' amenability to free speech, it is shown that in the United States, the correlation between university prestige and free speech can be accounted for by the behaviour of handful of institutions, plus variables that pertain to the prevalent academic culture as well as funding sources. Universities with a greater predominance of social science as well as less recipient of federal funding are less supportive of free speech. It is concluded that both academic culture and greater freedom from government do much to explain why elite American universities tend to be less supportive of free speech.

### **Introduction**

The debate on free speech in universities has tended to focus on flashpoint controversies, such as academics being hounded out of office for saying the 'wrong' thing, or speakers disinvited after objections by activist students are raised. Some contend these are isolated incidents blown out of proportion, others that they are the tip of the iceberg. They point to evidence showing that such censoriousness stems from the political left, that universities are dominated by the left almost to the point of monoculture in some fields, and that students and academics with heterodox views, often conservative, are more likely to report self-censorship. Attempts have been made to rate universities on their amenability to free speech, through surveys of students, as well as counting the numbers of regulations, restrictions, and controversies occurring in both the United States and United Kingdom. Past research has linked these to elite universities, at least in the UK. Building on this approach and using American data, it is shown that free speech amenability is lessened in the elite universities, but that this can be accounted for by a handful of institutions as well as variables that point to the academic culture in elite universities in general, and the extent to which they are free from federal funding. Universities with a greater influence of the social sciences that are less recipient of federal funding are less supportive of free speech.

### **Literature review**

According to Revers and Traunmuller (2020), views on academic freedom of speech can be split between those who see universities dominated by left-leaning students and backed up by university administrators who suppress speech in the name of anti-discrimination, and those who see only a

series of ‘singular scandalised events’ and a problem existing among a small, vocal radicalised minority. In this view, campus intolerance is a construct of the political right in its efforts to undermine anti-discrimination and diversity. However, there is sufficient evidence of free speech controversies as well as censoriousness, university regulations, and self-censorship evidenced through studies and polling. While it is correct to point out the flashpoints - ‘cancellations’, disinvitation, and dismissal – are relatively rare, they can be understood as the ‘tip of the iceberg’, which serve to promote greater reticence from scholars and students who hold unorthodox views. More often than not, those ostracised are on the political right.

Counting the number of free speech controversies on campus, such as protests against controversial speakers, no-platforming, disinvitations, and disciplinary proceedings against staff and students is not easy and inevitably limited by the extent to which they come to the attention of those who do the counting. The Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression (FIRE), led by Greg Lukianof, has been keeping a database of both “scholars under fire” and the numbers of speakers disinvited from speaking engagements at universities.

As seen in Figure 1, the numbers of scholars under fire, facing calls for the dismissal or sanctions has increased from less than 50 a year prior to 2016 to over 150 in more recent years, although much of the spike can be attributed to campaigns against leftist scholars orchestrated by the right-wing campaign group Turning Point USA. Nevertheless, campaigns overall have tended to come more from those to the left of the scholar in question (FIRE, 2023). The number of disinvited speakers has risen to under 50 a year, with more disinvitations initiated from the left of the speaker than the right by a ratio of 2.5:1 (FIRE, 2023). Similarly, figures from the United Kingdom point to less than 1 per cent of external speakers being cancelled or disinvited (Lewis, 2021).

<Figure 1 about here>

Evidence of a wider chill can be found in the work of Norris (2023), who analysed the ECPR-IPSA *World of Political Science* survey of roughly 2000 political scientists from almost 100 countries. She found a strong “liberal-left skew”, with political scientists more likely to adhere to liberal positions on things like abortion and gay marriage. Those with ‘heterodox’ views, meaning those at odds with the prevailing norms and in this case, social conservatives or those dissenting from the liberal consensus, were more likely to report self-censorship, but only in the West. Drawing on Noelle-Neuman (1974), Norris posits as an explanatory mechanism a “spiral of silence”, whereby through “fear of social isolation or loss of status, people are hesitant to express authentic views contrary to prevalent moral beliefs and social norms, producing self-censorship of ideas and values perceived as contrary to the prevailing climate of opinion” (Norris, 2023).

In an earlier paper, Norris argued that in post-industrial societies such as the United States, Sweden, and the United Kingdom where liberal values predominate, scholars of the right were more likely to perceive hostility. In more traditional cultures such as Nigeria, she found left-wing scholars felt more threatened, thus supporting her “fish-out-of-water” thesis (Norris, 2021). Research has also shown, based on four California State University campuses, that conservative scholars were both in the minority and more likely to report experiencing hostility, but that the discriminatory instincts of both liberals and conservatives were comparable (Honeycutt & Freberg, 2016).

The left-leaning predominance in the elite of American academia had earlier been confirmed by Langbert (2018) who found Democrats outnumbered Republicans by a ratio of 10.4:1. 78 per cent of institutions sampled were either entirely Republican-free or had negligible amounts. The ratio varied across subjects, being low in engineering and chemistry (1.6:1 and 5.2:1 respectively) but high in fields like art (40.3:1), sociology (43.8:1), and English (48.3:1). In anthropology and communications, no Republicans were found, while Langbert writes, “I could not find a single Republican with an exclusive appointment to fields like gender studies, Africana studies, and peace studies”. A similar leftward drift has also been confirmed in the United Kingdom by Carl (2017) who found around 50 per cent of the public support right-wing or conservative parties, compared to 12 per cent of academics. Right-wing academics are even rarer in the humanities, arts, and social sciences. Carl found the share of academics supporting the Conservatives may have declined by up to 25 percentage points since 1964.

Self-censorship on the right of academia has been evidenced by polling of academics conducted on behalf of the British think tank Policy Exchange. While stipulating that just 0.03 per cent of academics face ‘no-platforming’ or dismissal, this was presented as the ‘tip of the iceberg’ with 6 per cent of academics purportedly threatened with disciplinary action for speech-related incidents, 8 per cent willing to support a dismissal campaign, rising to 63 per cent expressing discomfort at the idea of sitting next to a ‘gender-critical’ colleague. As much as 72 per cent of academic ‘Leave’ supporters in the 2016 EU referendum were uncomfortable expressing their beliefs or unsure about doing so. While 23 per cent of right-wing academics were estimated to be prepared to rate a left-wing paper lower, a greater share of academics were prepared to penalise a Leaver in a job application (Adekoya, Kaufmann, & Simpson, 2020).

Polling of students from the United Kingdom shows both significant levels of censoriousness as well as self-censorship. A 2020 survey conducted by Survation on behalf of the charity ADF UK, found one in four students withheld their true opinions because they clash with those promoted by their university, and 44 per cent feared their lecturers would treat them differently if they expressed themselves openly (ADF UK/Survation, 2020). Separate polling found around 30 to 50 per cent of British students

consistently support academic freedom (Simpson & Kaufmann, 2019). Another poll of British students found the share who believed 'Students that feel threatened should always have their demands for safety respected' had increased by 11 percentage points between 2016 and 2022, from 68 per cent to 79 per cent. 61 per cent thought that universities 'should ensure all students are protected from discrimination rather than allow unlimited free speech', up 24 points since 2016. 36 per cent of students agreed academics should be dismissed if they 'teach material that heavily offends some students', up from 15 per cent in 2016 (Hillman, 2022).

Polling of American students has also detected a chill with the Heterodox Academy's *Annual Campus Expression Survey* finding in 2022 that 59 per cent of students were reluctant to discuss controversial topics, primarily for fear of judgement from other students (Heterodox Academy, 2023). In Germany, Revers and Traunmuller (2020) found looking at a 'most-likely case', namely the social science students of Goethe University Frankfurt, that sizeable numbers of students favoured censorship, with between one third and half preferring not to allow controversial speakers on campus, while around one third favoured banning controversial books. Left-leaning students were found to be more censorious on contentious issues such as gender, immigration, sexuality, and ethnicity, while right-leaning students would report greater self-censorship on such things.

Independent organisations have attempted to gauge the extent of restrictions on speech within universities. In the United Kingdom, the online magazine *Spiked* produced a ranking of British universities running from 2015 to 2018 and based on scoring universities on the extent to which they enact policies that restrict speech and conduct based on publicly available sources and requests made under the Freedom of Information Act. Using a 'traffic light system', 54 per cent of universities were classed as 'red' in 2018, meaning aggressive censorship of speakers, views, specific texts, or groups. 40 per cent were 'amber', meaning some restrictions through "unnecessary regulation", speaker-vetting, or guidance warning students on what not to say. Just 6 per cent were classed as 'green', meaning no significant restrictions on speech. The worst performers in 2018 were the Universities of Edinburgh and Oxford. The best were the Universities of Buckingham, Hertfordshire, and Wales Trinity St David. (Spiked, 2018)

This approach was taken on by the British think tank Civitas, which in 2020 produced its own ranking across 22 indicators. It classed 34 per cent of British universities as 'most restrictive', 51 per cent as 'moderately restrictive', and 14 per cent as 'most friendly'. Indicators included free speech controversies, restrictive policies, and officially sanctioned offensive 'speech acts', as gleaned from university open sources and reports in national and local media. 68 per cent of universities experienced a free speech controversy with these more prevalent in the leading Russell Group of research-intensive

universities. 72 per cent of universities had official policies that curbed free speech, while 80 per cent had bullying/harassment policies that restricted speech. Just over half had experienced a 'cancel culture' whereby open letters and petitions were promulgated calling for restrictions on staff, students, or visiting speakers (Civitas, 2020). A follow-up Civitas report found universities with "inflated diversity bureaucracies" tended to limit speech more. Of those universities with above average numbers of free speech controversies, 71 per cent had "tools for the anonymous reporting of academics and students, a race equality charter, and membership of an externally-sourced diversity training programme", compared to 24 per cent with less than average numbers (McConalogue, Harris, & Neal, 2021).

Subsequent research found free speech controversies tended to be more prevalent in the elite British universities with 374 counted overall between 2017 and 2020 (Norrie, 2022). They have further been shown to be empirically part of a wider phenomenon, termed 'radical progressivism', this being conceived of as, "a heightened political sensitivity to questions of race, sex, sexuality, and history" that sees individuals as "psychologically fragile and suffering from 'trauma'" and "better understood as members of social groups... who exist in 'power relations' of dominance and submission". Free speech controversies were shown to be more prevalent in universities that also had anonymous reporting of harassment schemes, official policies on so-called 'decolonisation' of the curriculum, Race Equality Charter membership, transgender-related restrictions on speech, and the use of trigger-warnings. A ranking was produced that showed radical progressivism to be most prevalent in elite British universities as well as where student satisfaction was less. The most radical progressive universities were Cambridge and Oxford (Norrie, 2023).

Rankings have also been enacted in the United States by College Pulse and FIRE, largely based on polling of students (method described below). Michigan Technological University was the most amenable to free speech, followed by Auburn University, the University of New Hampshire, Oregon State University, and Florida State University. The least amenable was Harvard, the only university to be classed as 'abysmal'. Students in the worst performing universities were more hostile to controversial conservative speakers than liberal ones, and more accepting of violent and disruptive forms of protest. On the whole, student opposition to conservative controversial speakers ranged from 57 to 72 per cent, compared to 29 to 43 per cent for liberal ones. 27 per cent of students accepted violence as permissible in order to stop a campus speech (College Pulse/FIRE, 2024).

Ranking studies of this kind can be criticised in that they are to varying degrees based on what comes to the attention of the researchers, either through reporting in the national media or what is disclosed by the universities themselves on their websites. The College Pulse/FIRE rankings while mostly based on survey data, also incorporate data on free speech controversies and so are in this bind too. There

is however no better method existent to date, while the Civitas variables that are reliant on media reporting (e.g. number of free speech controversies) tend to correlate with variables that are drawn from official university sources (e.g. number of policies on free speech), implying some level of convergent validity and suggesting media attention follows free speech controversy rather than constructs it (Norrie, 2023).

Thus, to date researchers have identified free speech controversies, leftist domination, censorship, self-censorship, and restrictions within universities on freedom of speech, both at the individual and university level. Little has been said however about the predictors of university-level hostility to freedom of speech. As a casual observation, much of the scholarship on free speech in universities seems to come from right-wing think tanks, while there are surprisingly few articles published in academic journals. This does not prove the point, but may nevertheless be telling.

## **Theory**

How might we theoretically predict university amenability to free speech? Past research has noted that free speech controversies and radical progressivism tend to be more pronounced in the elite of British universities (Norrie, 2022; 2023). Drawing on Elias (2020), it has been argued that elites seek to distinguish themselves through moral innovations manifesting itself in greater radical progressivism in the elite universities, which is linked theoretically and empirically to aversion to free speech (Norrie, 2023). Thus, we arrive at:

*Hypothesis 1 – Elite universities will be less amenable to free speech.*

In their research, Revers and Traunmueller deliberately chose Goethe University Frankfurt because of its legacy of Frankfurt School sociology, sometimes referred to as Critical Theory. They note that the University of Frankfurt was a “focal point” of the leftist student agitation during the 1960s and is known today for nurturing the next generations of the political left. As they argue, teaching at Frankfurt, under the influence of Critical Theory, “puts great emphasis on ideas that directly relate to the control of undesired speech”. Key ideas dominant in such thinking, include ‘speech act theory’ which sees speech as a form of action, ‘standpoint theory’ which seeks to privilege voices of those deemed ‘oppressed’, and ‘intersectionality’ which “evaluates discrimination according to the cumulative disadvantage of overlapping identities”. Thus, they expect censoriousness to be prevalent in Frankfurt in particular and in general where the influence of critical theory is felt (Revers & Traunmueller, 2020). Scholars have argued that Critical Theory has come to underwrite the ideology of the radical left (Sidewell, 2022; Glendening, 2023). We also know that fields such as the social sciences and humanities tend to be more left-leaning (Zipp, 2006) with the former in particular being the only notable residue of self-

described Marxists in American academia, put at 17.6 per cent compared to 5 per cent in the humanities and 0 per cent in the natural sciences (Gross & Simmons, 2007).

Thus, we arrive at the following hypothesis for testing:

*Hypothesis 2 – Universities focusing more on the social sciences will be less amenable to free speech.*

Universities have seen increased numbers of bureaucrats working within them. In the United States, the ratio of bureaucrats to faculty members stands at 2:1 in public and 2.5:1 in private universities, doubling since the 1970s. Much of this rise has been to meet increased regulations imposed on academia by the Obama administration. But it is also argued that much of the boom is voluntary with bureaucrats keen to hire underlings in order to boost their authority and pay (The Economist, 2018). Martin and Hill found that for every dollar spent to meet new government rules, \$2 was spent voluntarily, mostly on non-academic staff in public and \$3 in private universities (Martin & Hill, 2013). Scholars have debated the capacity for bureaucracy to be susceptible to political or ideological capture (Chen & Johnson, 2018). Critics point to a ‘New Elite’ of technocrats and bureaucrats who seek greater powers and come to run society at odds with the preferences of ordinary people (Goodwin, 2023). Growth in university bureaucracy can be attributed in part to diversity and inclusion bureaucrats who seek to regulate speech and behaviour (The Economist, 2018) with for instance, two thirds of colleges and universities providing diversity training for faculty members while the majority put freshers through it as part of their induction (Dobbin & Kalev, 2018). Research has shown universities that have greater diversity bureaucratic measures tend to have more frequent free speech controversies (McConalogue, Harris, & Neal, 2021). Thus, we arrive at:

*Hypothesis 3 – Universities with greater shares of bureaucrats among their staff will be less conducive to free speech.*

Government subsidies of higher education have been linked to both waste and increased regulation (Edwards & McCluskey, 2015). It is theorised universities will look to justify and maintain government subsidies through the creation of greater levels of regulation. Thus, we arrive at:

*Hypothesis 4 – Universities more reliant on government subsidies will be less conducive to free speech.*

American universities are more ethnically diverse than ever. In 1976, 82 per cent of undergraduates were white, falling to 51 per cent in 2021 (Statista, 2023). It is theorised that with greater diversity will come greater ethnic conflict or at least the probability of it, necessitating greater rules on what can and cannot be said, in order to maintain coexistence. Thus,

*Hypothesis 5 – Universities with greater ethnic diversity will be less conducive to free speech.*

### **Data and methods**

These hypotheses are tested using data from the United States, due to the descriptive richness of the data on American universities. Free speech in American universities is measured using the College Pulse/Fire scores for 2024, from which they produced their ranking. These are based on surveys of over 55,000 undergraduate students enrolled in four-year degree programmes in 254 colleges and universities in 2023. The survey is designed to include a diverse range of students. Students are sampled at large public universities, smaller private colleges, online providers, as well as historically black colleges, religious, and female only institutions. Results are weighted to be nationally representative.

The scores are computed from 13 components, of which six measure student perceptions while seven assess the behaviour of college administrators, faculty members, and students. Students were asked how comfortable they were expressing their ideas, their tolerance for liberal speakers, tolerance for conservative speakers, their acceptance of disruptive conduct, the level of administrative support for freedom of speech, and the openness with which they feel controversial topics can be discussed. Responses were on scales ranging from 10 to 33 depending on the item in question. Two indices were further computed, 'mean tolerance' and 'tolerance difference', measuring the average scores for the tolerance for liberal/conservatives items, and the absolute value of subtracting the tolerance for conservative speakers from tolerance for liberal speakers respectively.

Universities receive further points for supporting unequivocally embattled scholars, students, and speakers. They are penalised for sanctioning scholars or students and disinviting speakers. A final 'warning' rating was applied to those that "prioritise other values over a commitment to freedom of speech". The overall score is computed from the formula,  $Overall\ Score = (50 + ((Z.Raw\ Overall\ Score).10) + FIRE\ Rating$ , with the overall score being the summation of the student perception data and the FIRE Rating being the bonus points added or subtracted by the College Pulse/Fire researchers (College Pulse/FIRE, 2024). Higher scores represent greater acceptance of free speech and range from 0 for Harvard to 78.01 for Michigan Technological University (College Pulse/FIRE, 2024).

The prevalence of social science is operationalised by the share of degrees awarded in this subject. University prestige is operationalised by the size of the university's endowment *per capita* (number of students). The extent to which the university is dominated by its bureaucrats is measured by the ratio

of bureaucrats to academic staff.<sup>1</sup> The extent of federal funding is measured by the share of the university's income that comes from the federal government. Diversity is measured by using the Gin-Simpson index.<sup>2</sup> Data are sourced from University Scorecard 2022 (U.S. Department of Education, 2023), with the exception of data on staff which come from IPEDS (National Centre for Education Statistics, 2024). Where the FIRE scores refer to a university entity in its total, but the University Scorecard/IPEDS data refer to multiple campuses or branches, they are matched to the main of flagship campus.

In total, there are 248 universities for which there are FIRE data. The final sample numbers 245 due to missing data among the independent variables. While the sample is neither random nor exhaustive of all American higher education providers, it does capture the most prominent. Results should be interpreted with this in mind.

Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models are used. Unfortunately, data of this kind are often highly intercorrelated meaning multicollinearity is an inevitability. Thus, the modelling is deliberately kept limited with just variables to test the above hypotheses included, with the preference being for parsimony. The results should bear the caveat that further exploration would have been desired and might have brought about different results. All independent variables are standardised to facilitate comparability. Full descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1 below. The correlation matrix is presented in Table 2.

<Table 1 about here>

<Table 2 about here>

## Results

As seen in Table 3 below, **Model 1** shows a negative and statistically significant relationship between the size of endowment and free speech score. Note that seven universities were dropped from the analysis after closer inspection revealed them to be influential outliers.<sup>3</sup> Dropping these reduces the

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<sup>1</sup> Bureaucrats are classed as: business and financial operations occupations; community, social service, legal, arts, design, entertainment, sports, and media occupations; management occupations; office and administrative support occupations; public service; sales and related occupations; service occupations; student and academic affairs and other education services occupations. Academics are: research occupations; instruction occupations.

<sup>2</sup> Expressed by the formula  $1 - \sum_{i=1}^N p_i^2$ , where  $p$  is the share of any given ethnic group within any given university. Ethnic groups are defined as the total share of undergraduate-degree-seeking students who are classed as: white, black, Hispanic, Asian, American Indian/Alaska native, Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, mixed race, non-resident aliens, unknown.

<sup>3</sup> The original bivariate regression (Model 1) with the full dataset gave  $\beta = -3.2549$ , s.e. = 0.707,  $p = 0.000$ . The universities having undue influence were: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (d.f. beta = 0.51), California Institute of Technology (0.25), Princeton (0.62), Stanford (0.18), Dartmouth College (-0.13), University of

correlation between free speech and endowment size from -0.32 to -0.18, meaning a substantial proportion of the correlation can be accounted for by the unique attributes of these universities. The remainder of the correlation is explained away in **Model 2** when a control for social science is introduced. Its effect is negative and significant meaning universities with a greater focus on social science are less conducive to free speech. Thus, although there is an indirect effect of endowment, we reject Hypothesis 1 and affirm Hypothesis 2.

<Table 3 about here>

**Model 3** introduces our measure of bureaucrats, only there is no significant effect while the regression coefficient is mildly positive. Thus, Hypothesis 3 is rejected. **Model 4**, introduces the share of federal funding into the model. Its effect is surprisingly strongly positive and highly statistically significant. Its introduction reduces both the effects of social science and endowment. Thus, Hypothesis 4 is rejected. **Model 5** introduces our measure of diversity. While it is negative and insignificant, its introduction further reduces the effects of social science and endowment. The former suffers a reduction in significance down to the 10 per cent level ( $p = 0.074$ ). Note there is a degree of multi-collinearity in the model meaning some inflation of the standard errors, and so we should not read too much into this.<sup>4</sup> Thus, Hypothesis 5 is rejected. Looking at the effects plot in Figure 2, we see while we have significant effects, they are rather small ranging from about 6 to 10 points across the range of the social science and federal funding measures. The interquartile range in free speech scores is 14.2 implying small effects sizes are perhaps to be expected.

<Figure 2 about here>

### Discussion and conclusion

The empirical results did much to confound the theoretical expectations. Evidence was found to support just one out of five hypotheses. While American elite universities *do* tend to be less amenable to free speech, this was largely explained away by the behaviour of a handful of institutions as well as the size of the influence of social science. Thus, we can infer that the lack of support for free speech in elite universities has something to do with their academic culture in question. While there are no direct effects of bureaucracy and diversity on free speech, they do serve to ameliorate *some* of the relationship between social science and free speech, implying that these both shape the cultures of

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Pennsylvania (-0.27), and Harvard (-1.18). A critical threshold was calculated as  $\frac{2}{\sqrt{248}} = 0.13$ . Note that keeping all these cases, particularly Harvard, in Model 5 produces a significant effect for Endowment, with  $\beta = -1.9150$ , s.e. 0.7628,  $p = 0.012$ ,  $R^2 = 0.08$ .

<sup>4</sup> Variance inflation factors for Model 5 are: Endowment = 1.345; Social science = 1.638; Bureaucrats = 1.157; Federal funding = 1.1583; Diversity = 1.169. While not necessarily large, they would be sufficient to push the p-values across any given threshold where there is proximity.

universities *somehow*. The biggest puzzle is the positive relationship between federal funding and free speech. The theoretical expectation was that the former would undermine the latter. Note also that its introduction also reduced the effect of endowment, implying a lack of federal funding also has something to do with elite academic culture. At this point, any theoretical musings are purely speculative, but one might ask if with greater freedom from the federal government, which is bound by the 1<sup>st</sup> Amendment of the United States Constitution to support freedom of speech, elite academic culture has more reign to place regulations on speech. In essence, there is less taboo on enacting free speech restrictions where there is greater independence of action. It should also be pointed out that no significant effects are observed when a control for public/private is introduced into Model 5 indicating that the hostile conditions for free speech are mostly found within the private institutions,<sup>5</sup> but at this point the argument becomes circular – why are elite institutions hostile to free speech? Because they are elite institutions.

This study has looked at the correlates of free speech amenability in American universities, examining how this is potentially shaped by variables that encompass elite status, academic culture, workforce, sources of funding, and student composition. Past research conducted on British universities revealed free speech was linked to elite status. This paper builds on this by arguing that relationship can be explained away to a degree by looking at what is taught within them, as well as the extent to which they are free to pursue their own agenda. All this would point towards ideological capture as the culprit. Note that private British universities tended to do better on free speech while in America, the elite private universities are among the worst offenders. Ultimately, this study suffers from uncertainty as to the validity of its dependent variable since we cannot be certain how much it is influenced by measurement biases pertaining to the extent to which controversies are brought to light. Nevertheless, it is hoped this study does enough to highlight the extent of the issue and provide some explanation for it.

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<sup>5</sup> Private: B = -3.71, s.e. = 2.02, p = 0.07

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## Appendix: Tables and graphs

Figure 1. Number of free speech controversies at American universities (FIRE)




Table 1. Descriptive statistics

	Mean	Standard deviation	Range	N
Free speech	46.1	11.5	0 – 78.01	248
Social science	0.12	0.09	0 – 0.43	248
Endowment	\$303,048	\$726,265	\$51.2 – \$5,277,700	245
Bureaucrats	1.39	0.5	0.50 – 3.75	248
Federal funding	0.12	0.09	0.001 – 0.45	248
Diversity	0.60	0.15	0.24 – 0.81	248

Table 2. Correlation matrix (N=245)

	Free speech	Social science	Endowment	Bureaucrats	Federal funding	Diversity
Free speech	1.00	-0.32	-0.28	-0.10	0.32	-0.21
Social science	-0.32	1.00	0.30	0.22	-0.56	0.29
Endowment	-0.28	0.30	1.00	0.26	-0.31	0.32
Bureaucrats	-0.10	0.22	0.26	1.00	-0.32	-0.01
Federal funding	0.32	-0.56	-0.31	-0.32	1.00	-0.19
Diversity	-0.21	0.29	0.32	-0.01	-0.19	1.00

Table 3. OLS regression analysis of free speech scores (standardised regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Endowment	-3.311*** (1.171)	-1.356 (1.252)	-1.497 (1.278)	-1.034 (1.27)	-0.684 (1.304)
Social science		-2.842*** (0.753)	-2.884*** (0.758)	-1.739** (0.851)	-1.551* (0.865)
Bureaucrats			0.415 (0.726)	0.863 (0.733)	0.735 (0.74)
Federal funding				2.387*** (0.851)	2.386*** (0.851)
Diversity					-0.858 (0.731)
Constant	46.077*** (0.713)	46.291*** (0.696)	46.279*** (0.697)	46.349*** (0.688)	46.369*** (0.688)
Observations	238	238	238	238	238
R <sup>2</sup>	0.033	0.088	0.089	0.119	0.124
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.029	0.08	0.078	0.104	0.105
Residual Std. Error	10.764 (df = 236)	10.474 (df = 235)	10.489 (df = 234)	10.339 (df = 233)	10.330 (df = 232)
F Statistic	7.991*** (df = 1; 236)	11.345*** (df = 2; 235)	7.651*** (df = 3; 234)	7.872*** (df = 4; 233)	6.583*** (df = 5; 232)

Significance: \*\*\*1%, \*\*5%, \*10%

Figure 2. Effects plot based on Model 5

