A "Religion of Peace"? Deconstructing the Pew Survey Results

Abstract

Contrary to a popular impression in some leading circles, an argument is offered questioning whether Islam is in fact a "religion of peace," as it promotes itself to outsiders. Evidence mustered features Islam's own occasional revelatory declarations about its true nature, including some culled from prominent secondary data, and behavioral indications of actual beliefs, values, and motivations. If the analysis is correct, failure to discern the reality could prove mortally dysfunctional for Western societies. Finally, concerning the interface of method and content (comparable to the epistemology–ontology distinction in philosophy), although coming from a social science measurement perspective, this analytic essay endeavors to serve the most fundamental metaphysical purpose of all: excavation of the truth, even if that truth is unpleasant or unpopular.

Keywords: Islam, mass violence, misleading polling, Pew, terrorism

Word count: 5,363

Especially following the 20-year commemoration of the 9/11 Islamist terrorist attack, someone needs to have the moral courage to advance the hypothesis formally in a respectable outlet: Islam is not a religion of peace. Its essential character is far from that, conspicuously. In particular, consistent evidence shows that a large numerical segment of the world's present-day Muslims are *not* opposed to terrorism against the United States and the West.

How could one not notice? For those subscribing to the prevalent public relations template portraying Muslim civilians as predominantly moderate and peaceful, and that only a small proportion are violently hostile to Western civilization, let us ponder the empirical evidence. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attack in the U.S., some considerable targeted polling was done by international research firms, especially the Pew organization. At that time (mid-2002), about 25-35% of polled Western Muslims (primarily in the U.K. and France) admitted that they were actually in support of terrorism against America (Bynum 2005; Pew Global 2006). If that many acknowledge something so emotionally and politically charged to a total stranger pollster, what proportion would really feel that way—50% or more? Although somewhat speculative, given the well-established tendency for survey respondents to circumspectly provide socially acceptable and politically correct answers (Day and Robles 1989), this is a fair and conservative educated guess, especially when noting the many "refusals to answer" which could mask socially unacceptable responses.

Among Eastern Muslim populations, it is much worse. According to the 2002 Pew poll specifically, 65% of Muslims in Jordan, 82% of those in Lebanon, 43% from Indonesia, and 38% from Pakistan then supported violence against Western civilian targets in the form of suicide bombings—although a small sub-fraction conceded that they prefer it only "rarely" (Pew Global 2005, p. 2). (Those would be the "moderates" by terrorist standards?) By 2004, the Pakistani

terror support contingent had risen to 49%. The level in Morocco that year was 55%; among

Turkish Muslims, 24% (Pew Global 2005).

From 2006 Pew survey results, the chilling totals were 57% (Jordan), 53% (Egypt), and

69% (Nigeria) in terms of acceptance of terrorism as an Islamic tactic. That year the comparable

numbers for the Muslims of Britain and France were still 24% and 35% respectively (Pew

Global 2006, p. 4). Again, if that high a proportion readily admits to those attitudes to such an

extent, what should one think the true magnitude of Muslim terrorism support is? Might it likely

be even greater?

A brief digression: What of Western public approval of civilian casualties caused by

their governments in military conflict? There is a qualitative and moral distinction between that

scenario and terrorism (Larson and Savych 2007). The latter, by definition, intends civilian

fatalities, while military action does not necessarily and does not generally (although exceptions

are known), regardless of how many such casualties eventuate.

Over time, with more polling experience, Muslims have come to subdue their poll

responses a bit, perhaps understanding the negative public image effects of such provocative

numbers.[1] For instance, 2009 Pew findings were 44% for Jordan, 56% for Lebanon, 48% for

Egypt, 67% for Nigeria, 35% for Indonesia, and only 13% for Pakistan *qua* support of terrorism.

Likewise, by that time, merely 13% of American Muslims declared approval of suicide

bombings. Progress! Unfortunately, the Palestinian territory concurrently clocked in with an

83% terror endorsement, and the similarly belligerent feelings of Israeli Muslims (45%) found in

the research might be considered especially noteworthy and alarming (Horowitz 2009).

But instead of real evolution of attitudes in the Muslim world, follow-up polling reveals a

portrait of continuing support for terrorist violence such as suicide bombing of innocent civilians.

From the 2010 Pew results, the troubling profile of national Muslim approval of terrorist

bombing includes these highlights: public terror approval at the level of 59% in Lebanon, 51% in

Nigeria, 54% in Egypt, 45% in Jordan, and 29% in Indonesia (Pew Research 2010, p. 13).

Progress nullified, apparently, in favor of stable and enduring terrorism indulgence across

Muslim populations.

In more recent polls (2011-14), Pew has asked a more restrictive question, phrased as

support for suicide bombing against civilians "to defend Islam from its enemies." In a

surprisingly amateurish oversight, this locution abstracts from the possibility of other

motivations for the terror tactic. Findings still signify inhumane proclivities nonetheless. The

2014 attitudinal contour includes these levels of terrorism assent: Jordan 44%, Lebanon 54%,

Egypt 59%, the Palestinian territory 59% (Gaza 75%), with a new entrant, the Bangladesh

Muslims, reporting in with 61% approval of suicide bombing attacks (Pew Research 2014, p. 8).

Despite the non-comparable wording, not much real change is observed. The longitudinal trend,

outlined in Table 1, shows only a marginal decline from a year 2002 composite mean of 49.6%

to 44.4% in 2014, when Pew stopped regular polling on the matter, although slightly different

groups of nations are reported. (Another technical note: One problem with previous and

superficial interpretation of this type of survey data has been the tendency to count the "rarely"

response as non-support of terrorism. But what does "rarely" mean to a respondent in this

context? Only *one* 9/11-type attack per year? One every five years? Every six months? No

more than once a week? The semantic frame-of-reference problem is evident, and the poll

numbers as cited here correct for that error by consolidating all response categories other than

"never" and "don't know." One who favors "rare" terrorism still favors terrorism, in other

words. The overall pattern yielded is roughly consistent with other research, which amounts to a form of convergent validation; Berger 2014.)

Table 1 here

Also recall the spectacle of Arab Muslim throngs celebrating in the streets of Middle East capitals on the original 9/11 occasion. As social scientists well know, high-intensity behavior is normally a reliable indicant of true sentiments (Atkins and Bieri 1968; Churchill 1988, p. 338). There is a reason why mainstream Islam has done pitifully little to oppose and resist the worldwide atrocities committed by the terrorist wing of its sect, and the poll numbers expose that reason's identity. Lack of consensus is a charitable way of describing it. A very large part of the Muslim population in agreement with the violence is a more candid way, which largely dispatches the myth of a religion of peace. (The Arab League's criticism of the 9/11 attack is one of the exceptions. Of course, the Arab League is not a group of individuals but a trans-national organization of governments, with natural political motives.)

Specific and Poignant Historical Testimony

The preceding are the telling and unattractive facts. Yet none of this should come as a surprise given the violent philosophy permeating the Quran. A sampling, quoting the Muslim holy book verbatim (1968):

"Slay the [non-Muslim] idolaters wherever you find them, and take them captives and besiege them" [9:5].

"Kill them wherever you find them . . . and fight them until there is no more [disbelief] and worship is for Allah alone" [2:191-193].

"Fight those who do not believe in Allah" [9:29].

"The hypocrites . . . will be seized wherever found and slain with a fierce slaughter" [33:60-62].

"When you meet those who disbelieve, smite at their necks until when you have killed and wounded many of them" [47:3-4].

"And the Jews . . . the Christians . . .; may Allah destroy them" [9:30].

"Believers, make war on the infidels who dwell around you" [9:123].

"Strike off their heads, strike off the very tips of their fingers" [8:12].

"Until they flee in the way of Allah . . . seize them and slay them" [4:89].

"The punishment of [Jews and Christians] is only this: that they should be murdered or crucified or their hands and their feet should be cut off" [5:33]. ("*Only* this"?)

"Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah, and those who are with him are ruthless to the Unbelievers" [48:29].

"Fighting is prescribed for you, and ye dislike it. But it is possible that ye dislike a thing which is good for you" [2:216].

"We would destroy a township . . . we annihilate it with complete annihilation" [17:16].

To augment the grisly tableau, some attributed Muhammad quotes from the renowned Islamic chronicler Bukhari (1997) are also rather picturesque: "Whoever changed his Islamic religion, then kill him" [84:57]; "[t]here is a Jew hiding . . . , so kill him" [52:256]; "fight with the people until they say, 'None has the right to be worshipped but Allah'" [4:196].

We could go on, and there is hardly anything comparable in the Bible (or Torah), and no comparison in terms of volume. It would not be productive to even try to stretch the much rarer Biblical references to violence (e.g., an "eye for an eye") into something equivalent. That book's comprehensive message is passivity, peace, and love. Empirically, the Center for the Study of Political Islam finds the Quran about ten times as violent as the Bible per unit of text, with approximately 16% of Quran content, literally at least 109 passages, referencing violence in some way (Warner 2010). Moreover, the respective orientations are different. The Bible's violence is mainly anecdotal, not prescriptive, and almost exclusively confined to the Old Testament. When otherwise, it applies to a limited historical narration and situational context (Fretheim 2004, pp. 20-23). The Quran, though, advises slaughter of anyone who is not Muslim—an obligatory belief, without qualification or expiration date, for all who claim to practice Islam.

Reflect upon the difference between the documented passivity and saintliness of the human historical figure Jesus Christ, in contrast to the personal characteristics of mass murderer, slave-master, serial rapist, and Islamic icon Muhammad. The sordid litany is literal, unfortunately (Andrae 1960, pp. 147-162, 171, 188-189; Cook 1996, p. 58), as Muslims themselves know and, alas, revere these traits of their putative prophet. This Muhammad/Jesus discrepancy is revealing of Islam's intrinsic values; thus it is natural for many Islamists to continue to take the Quran's jihadist guidance seriously. Islamic adherents can no longer credibly claim that only the faith's lunatic fringe element internalizes barbarism. As a Muslim insider (Hirsi Ali 2015) discloses:

 [T]he call to violence and the justification for it are explicitly stated in the sacred texts of

 Islam. . . . In Islam, those seeking religious reform are the fringe element.

Even Lounnas (2023), maybe unintentionally, describes how hate and violence suffuse orthodox Muslim thinking.

The contemporary probative evidence remains the large plurality of ostensibly non-terrorist Muslims who self-reveal shared terrorist sympathies, as summarized here. A further piece of that evidentiary mosaic would be the fact that a number of national Muslim populations have freely voted radical Islamic regimes into power, such as in Egypt, the Palestinian territory, Turkey, and Tunisia. More recent cross-validation comes from polled Palestinian support in the 64-83% range for the October 2023 Hamas slaughter of 1200 Israeli civilians (Feis 2023; Greyman-Kennard 2023).

Qualitative, If Unspeakable, Detail

Not even treated yet is the officially sanctioned individual-level violence permeating Muslim society, approved and accepted on religious grounds. (Countless nations suffer a major violent crime problem, including those in the developed West. Some nominally advanced societies featured the violence of slavery or colonialism within past centuries, and the atrocities of Hitler, Stalin, and Mao were visited much more recently. The difference here is the routine, present-day public administration of violence grounded in the dominant Muslim religious culture.) Examples of such barbarity include beheading, crucifixion, maiming, whipping, and stoning as judicial penalties, as applied in the prototype Islamic State, for instance. Even Saudi Arabia commonly beheads women for "sorcery and witchcraft" (Salem 2014; a factoid that came as a surprise to this author, too). In Pakistan, any statement critical of the "prophet" Muhammad or Islam itself is designated as blasphemy and a capital crime. According to Pew polling on the subject, overwhelming majorities throughout the Muslim world favor the death penalty for the

crime of leaving the Islam religion (Pew Research 2013, p. 8), so this embedded violence is decidedly not a top-down phenomenon only imposed by government or religious hierarchy.

Additionally, for the record, what have not been mentioned until now are genital mutilation of females and the widespread ritual practice of "honor killing" of one's own female offspring, two special idiosyncrasies of Islam. Another Muslim novelty, for that matter, is the tendency to wage mayhem against cartoonists who have offended the religion's delicate sensibilities. Can one dare project what extreme behavior pattern would be manifest if Islam were not such a "religion of peace"?

It is past time to think the unthinkable and speak the ineffable: Perhaps not all religions are equally good or bad. But since when is it allowed to criticize another's religion? Since all along, frankly—e.g., Martin Luther and the Protestant reformation, and in more recent decades the virulent anti-Semitism that is blithely tolerated in much of the world, apparently including Western Europe (Stephens 2015). Muslims themselves are anything but reluctant to criticize or often persecute Christianity and Judaism, even outlawing their practice in Muslim territory, sometimes under penalty of mortal consequences. And Western secular progressives do not exactly abstain from vocally attacking Christianity, notably in the United States.

Ultimately, there is the overt terrorist conduct of the most dedicated and passionate practitioners of Islam, regularly if not universally directed at Christians and Jews expressly because of their religion. By contrast, we have not observed thousands of reciprocal attacks on Muslim civilians perpetrated by Roman Catholic priests and nuns or Jewish rabbis. (Can it be agreed that Christianity's aberrant Crusades endeavor has not been repeated in over 700 years?) True, the most high-profile beheadings of women and children, along with more "conventional" mass murders, are conducted by Islamic radicals, but the empirical numbers reported here

bespeak substantial support from rank-and-file Muslims. This unpleasant and contrarian finding is what needs to be more broadly recognized.

In the interest of balance, what of the many peaceful parts of Quran text and all those pacifist, saintly Imams? No doubt there are a multitude of each, objectively a preponderance of Quran verbal substance as already conceded, and the same will be stipulated of the Imam community. Regardless, an institution is rightfully judged by the totality of its conduct. The institution of Islam simply exhibits too much of a pattern of violent atrocities at both the micro and mass levels, along with far too much tacit approbation by its membership, to warrant anything but an adverse overall verdict. Why is there no cadre of Muslim clerics declaring fatwa and jihad against the terrorist element?

Analogously, the Soviet Union's constitution was a beautiful document. Yet it was conveniently ignored as the Soviet regime slaughtered about 100 million of its own citizens during the empire's seven-decade existence (Rummel 1990). "Religion of peace" appears to be the same type of empty verbiage, as its derivative social policy history now even includes genocide in the self-declared Islamic State. Modern Islam, in reality, is not only a religion but a cultural, social, political, and military movement requiring submission by all. From the preceding litany of offenses, the contribution of Islam to this world's aggregate conflict scorecard certainly appears to have been transformative.

In retrospect, any who did not already perceive the foregoing bill of particulars should be asking themselves why not. And they should consider becoming very angry at the prevailing politically-correct disinformation environment for so engineering their cognitions.

That diversionary propaganda also serves to highlight the magnitude of political hypocrisy on this and corollary issues. American liberals/progressives, so-called, who claim to

be the peace-and-love side, are increasingly intolerant of, and openly hostile to, Christianity—which really is a religion defined by peace and love—while rhetorically contorting themselves to excuse the chronically violent and ruthless Islam (Duke 2017; French 2016; Gaski 2014). (Yes, ruthless, as Muhammad himself recommended per an earlier citation.) American pseudo-feminists may be the worst offenders in this regard as they turn a blind eye to Islam's discrimination and brutality toward women (Ghoussoub 1987, pp. 16-17).

Of course, not all Muslims are comfortable abetting the mass violence of terrorism, but now it can be deduced that the peaceful segment of Islam's population of disciples is far smaller than advertised. Again, there clearly is much more than an insignificant minority who favor aggressive, militant jihad against the West, especially the U.S. Although not every Muslim is a terrorist, observers can hardly be expected not to notice that practically all cases of worldwide terrorist attacks are perpetrated by Muslims in declared service to Islam.[2]

To reinforce, consider a fair and representative listing of the more prominent terrorist groups: Abu Nidal, Abu Sayyaf, Hamas, Hezbollah, Palestine Liberation Front, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, al-Qaeda, al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, Ansar al-Islam, ISIS, al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Army of Islam, Indian Mujahedeen, Haqqani Network, Boko Haram, Ansar al-Sharia, al-Nusrah, Muslim Brotherhood, the Taliban. Remarkably, all of the itemized are Islamist. And of the U.S. State Department's official list of 69 foreign terrorist organizations, 60 are Muslim in ideology (U.S. Department of State 2020).

Conclusion and Implication

A primary message of this report and essay is that the terrorist-sympathetic subset of international Islam is not so small, possibly a majority. (As mentioned, subtract out the

circumspect Pew poll "no answer" rates of from one to 23 percent in individual countries/years and the actual terror support could easily be a majority.) Among the associated public falsity, former U.S. President Barack Obama's now-notorious unsupported assertion of "99.9 percent" contra-terrorist Muslims (Boyer 2015) is hereby rebutted as unsupportable. Of course, George W. Bush uttered a similar canard. If this recital causes discomfort, so be it, but consciousness of reality should not be repressed. "A problem recognized is half solved," goes the adage. But, if even self-selected readers are resisting at this moment, will the problem ever be generally recognized?

If Islam truly embodies a mortal danger to the West or civilization generally, that information cannot safely be ignored by the target. Such blind denial of a threat can be fatal. In this case, the mortality of the threat is established by (1) the 3000-fatality toll from 9/11 and (2) the thousands more slaughtered annually by Islamic terrorism since, in conjunction with (3) Islam's mandate to compel all non-Muslims to submit, even by force. The premises adduced here may be arguable (the author does invite contest), but abundant supportive evidence has at least been marshaled for consideration in this piece. What is established objectively is that the "Religion of Peace" slogan is challenged by considerable contrary evidence. Readers can infer their own conclusions.

Consequences for Western societies indeed may be foreseeable. Muslim apologists in the U.S. and elsewhere owe an explanation for why law enforcement should not ethnically, geographically, or demographically profile the groups who are more likely to support terrorist acts against the West, based on the quoted poll results. Some obviously fail to distinguish between profiling and *invidious* profiling—between invidious discrimination and innocuous, rational, sensible, and proper discrimination based on evidentiary metrics such as presented here

about a relevant societal category. Failure to *discriminate* between the two antitheses is a matter of taking a misplaced non-discrimination impulse and "political correctness" ideology a bit too far. One country in particular, the United States—at least a major political faction of it—has put itself in the grip of national neurosis by equating sanity and security with bigotry. (About 95% of violent crime, in the West and worldwide, is committed by males. Is it anti-male bigotry for criminal detectives not to divide their investigatory efforts equally between males and females?)

To distill and encapsulate, a sizable plurality or even a majority of one of the world's largest religious groups is on record favoring mass murder of Americans and others in service to its theocratic cause, and one of America's two major ideo-cultural camps sees no evil, hears no evil, and emphatically speaks no evil, literally refusing to allow speaking the name of the enemy in the ongoing world war against Islamic fascism. (The referenced former President Obama, not incidentally, proclaimed that the Islamic State is not Islamic, even though now publicly repudiated by Wood in *The Atlantic*; 2015.) One can hope, maybe quixotically, that the evidence proffered here can serve as an appropriate and remedial counterweight, for that is its practical purpose.

However, attendant circumstances are not auspicious. For instance, strained parsing and excuse-making for Islamo-terrorism has visibly descended into absurdity. The logical extension of this posture is actually that there can be no such thing as Islamic terrorism! To wit, justifying resistance to even using the term "Islamic terrorism," the Obama administration's sophistic position first recycled the question-begging and now discredited major premise that "Islam is a religion of peace." Following that was premise #2: Terrorism is not peaceful. Therefore, the *Bizarro*-world conclusion: No terrorism is Islamic.

QED, presumably. The error, of course, is in the false premise.

Another not-so-subtle distinction that has been widely missed is this: If a Western extremist group such as the Ku Klux Klan cites Christianity in the commission of violence, it is indeed anti-Christian nevertheless because the violence would be directly opposed to the religion's fundamental tenets including the Ten Commandments. However, violence by ISIS or al-Qaeda terrorists is not inherently anti-Islamic because such action is perfectly congruent with the Quran's guidance and Muhammad's example.

When they write America's obituary, perhaps soon, the cause of death likely will be reported as national suicide—assisted suicide, anyway, with assistance coming from hostile forces eager to accommodate. And then maybe someone will notice the irony that the United States' last seven military engagements were undertaken to protect *Muslim* populations. As Clare Booth Luce is said to have said, and as Oscar Wilde did say, "No good deed goes unpunished." The maxim appears to apply very well to one contemporary facet of international and inter-cultural relations.

Epilogue

Inevitably, in the currently polarized socio-political climate, some will erroneously or spuriously brand the preceding as Islamophobic. But what does the word "Islamophobia" mean? What is its formal definition? You can take your time to answer. Actually, this is an easy question because there is more than one correct answer.

In the meantime, a diversion: When was the first time you ever heard of the word "Islamophobia," as best you can remember? Other than very young readers, who have heard it their whole lives, the likely answer for most would be about 20 years ago—say, following the

9/11 terrorism attack and its aftermath. There is a reason why that answer would be very common, but maybe not the reason you expect.

As many also will recall, America was rather agitated against the 9/11 terrorists at the time, and could not help noticing that they all were Muslims, as are nearly all terrorist groups worldwide (per the U.S. State Department's listing of international terrorist organizations). So, the propaganda arm of international Islam realized it had a public relations problem. "People are on to us; they are beginning to realize our movement's true, violent nature," they might have thought. But what to do about it? Their response strategy is obvious to anyone who knows anything about marketing and PR: They launched a propaganda campaign to equate *any* criticism of Islam with bigotry, thereby intimidating potential critics into submitting to that constraint and effectively silencing any opposition. Widespread Muslim PR was around earlier, of course (Peretz 2011), but it intensified, of necessity, after 9/11.

Evidence of this? Your own memory: Have you ever seen any criticism of Islam that was not immediately denounced as bigotry, i.e., Islamophobia? In fact, how rare is it to see or hear criticism of Islam, period, especially relative to the provocations? Evidence of the campaign's effectiveness: Why is it that there is one and only one particular religion we are not allowed to criticize? Instead, surely you have noticed abundant public criticism of Christianity and Judaism. In some Muslim countries, practice of either religion is a capital crime!

*   *   *

But does Islam itself, the so-called "religion of peace," deserve any criticism? Return to the question of what Islamophobia means. The natural, inherent meaning of the term is fear of Muslims. Obviously, however, the prevailing usage has transmuted into a practical meaning of hostility toward Muslims, as any online dictionary can confirm. I do not represent the latter *nouveau* meaning. I can only endorse hostility toward the large proportion of world Muslims

who support terrorism and mass murder. Shouldn't we all? You have a problem with that?
(Again conjure the massive international polling effort by the Pew organization from 2002 to
2014 and what it exposed about Muslim support for terrorism and suicide bombing.) Yet we
also cannot deny that the grounding for such violent Muslim sentiment can be found in the
Quran's aggressive advice and the murderous example of Muhammad himself. So, I suggest that
genuine, devout Muslims take a hard look at their religion, and the barbaric behavior practiced in
its name.

By the same token, fear of Muslims can indeed be reasonable, given the violent record of
the religion's most intense adherents along with the sect's core purpose of imposing submission
on the entire world, by force if necessary. Islam, once again, by its own testimony, is not only a
religion but a cultural, social, and military movement with all non-Muslims targeted, so to speak.
Sorry to break the news this way.

Allahu Akhbar, and heaven help the rest of us. "Be afraid, be very afraid." And
remember my name, just in case this modest opus makes me the next victim of a fatwa, a jihad,
or *Charlie Hebdo*-type mayhem. Can we imagine what Islam's record of violence would be if it
were not such a "religion of peace"?

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The author's primary research specialization is the study of social and political power and
conflict. He is also a long-time registered Democrat and occasional registered Republican—
intermittently, not simultaneously—which should dispatch any erroneous impression of
partisanship.

Footnotes

1. This hypothesized disingenuousness would be consistent with the alleged Muslim practice of al-taqiyya, which is the Quran-sanctioned justification for deceiving non-Muslims to achieve the ends of Islam (16:106; 3:28; 40:28). Still, many Muslims claim that this particular tenet of Sharia law has been over-interpreted by critics.

2. This report does focus on insurgent rather than incumbent terrorism. It is not disputed that governments such as Kim's North Korea and Saddam's Iraq contemporarily, or the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany historically, have been responsible for a greater absolute volume of terrorist violence than the Islamic terrorists have.

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Table 1.

Support for Terrorism among National Muslim Populations (%)

	2002	'04	'05	'06	'07	'09	'10	'11	'14
Bangladesh	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	61
Egypt	---	---	---	53	---	48	54	62	59
Indonesia	43	---	33	28	---	35	29	21	22
Israel	---	---	---	---	---	45	---	---	46
Jordan	65	---	88	57	---	44	45	44	44
Lebanon	82	---	58	---	---	56	59	60	54
Morocco	---	55	18	---	---	---	---	---	---
Nigeria	---	---	---	69	---	67	51	---	26
Pakistan	38	49	44	22	---	13	13	---	---
Palestinian territory	---	---	---	---	---	83	---	78	59
Turkey	20	24	20	26	---	26	10	21	29
United States	---	---	---	---	22	13	---	---	---

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Source: Pew Research Center, Washington, DC