

Ideologically Incongruent Authoritarianism:

Understanding Liberal Right-Wing Authoritarians and Conservative Left-Wing Authoritarians

Supplements

Do Liberals or Conservatives Show More Ideologically Incongruent Authoritarianism?

We explored whether liberals or conservatives tend to show more ideologically incongruent authoritarianism. To evaluate, we computed 2 (Participant Ideology: Liberal versus Conservative) X 2 (Type of Authoritarianism: LWA versus RWA) ANOVAs for authoritarianism as both a continuous and a categorical variable. Both types of analyses revealed similar interactions between participant ideology and type of authoritarianism (interaction F 's > 2850.7, p 's < .001). Descriptive means of the interactions reveal that, although the gaps are large in both cases, there is an even larger gap for between conservatives' and liberals' authoritarianism scores for RWA than for LWA. This is consistent with the previously-noted finding that LWA-ideology effect sizes, although large on their own, are generally smaller than RWA-ideology effect sizes (see, e.g., Conway et al., 2018). However, as revealed in Supplemental Table 3, both continuous and categorical measurements show this difference is due more to a larger gap between liberals and conservatives in congruent authoritarianism (liberals high in LWA, conservatives high in RWA) than a difference in incongruent authoritarianism.

	LWA Liberals	LWA Conservatives	RWA Conservatives	RWA Liberals
Standardized Continuous Authoritarianism	0.44	-0.67	0.81	-0.51
Dichotomized Authoritarianism	0.67	0.25	0.86	0.27

Notes: Continuous Authoritarianism Measure Standardized Within Study. See Dichotomized Measure Computation in Text. Ideologically Incongruent Cells in **BOLD**.

The remaining analyses begin to unravel what these incongruent authoritarians are like.

Additional Results Including 2 X 2 ANOVAs

Age and Biological Sex Assigned at Birth

A clear pattern for incongruent authoritarians emerged for age: For both LWA and RWA, incongruent authoritarians were the youngest category (especially for liberal high-RWA persons). In both cases, high authoritarian categories were younger than low authoritarian categories, but this drop was

larger for incongruent authoritarians, 2 (Authoritarianism: High or Low) X 2 (Ideology: Liberal or Conservative) ANOVA interaction p 's < .003.

Results for biological sex assigned at birth revealed a somewhat more complicated pattern. For LWA, by far the highest percentage of males was in the incongruent category. This was not the case for RWA. However, this was partially due to the fact that liberals were more likely to be female than conservatives, as both LWA and RWA showed an interaction in the same direction: regardless of authoritarianism type, the percentage of males increased more from low-to-high authoritarianism for incongruent authoritarians (interaction p 's < .03).

These results suggest that on average, incongruent authoritarians tend to be younger than other categories, and (once accounting for the fact that a higher percentage of liberals are female) more likely to be male.

Ideological Ambivalence and Religiosity

Ideological Ambivalence. We computed two two-way interactions for LWA and RWA effects separately using the ideological ambivalence measurement as the DV. For both LWA and RWA, these results revealed main effects of ideology and authoritarianism, and an interaction between ideology and authoritarianism (all p 's < .001). As can be seen in Table 3 in the main text, for LWA, incongruent conservatives were clearly higher than the other three groups; while for RWA, there was more of a crossover interaction.

To better understand this ideological ambivalence, we also computed parallel analyses using the categorical measurement of ideology as the DV. Paired with the ambivalence measure, this allows us to get a larger picture of incongruent authoritarians. For both LWA and RWA, these results revealed main effects of ideology and authoritarianism, and an interaction between ideology and authoritarianism (all

p 's < .006). In both cases, incongruent authoritarians showed more of a rise in their opposing ideology (compared to low-authoritarian persons) than congruent authoritarians.

However, this interaction story belies an important descriptive truth: Both liberal and conservative incongruent authoritarians showed low overall identification with the opposing ideology, and indeed generally showed congruence with their ideology score and not with their authoritarianism score. Liberal right-wing authoritarians largely reported themselves as categorically liberal (91%; low-RWA liberals = 99%), while conservative left-wing authoritarians largely reported themselves as categorically conservative (85%; low-LWA conservatives = 98%).

This leaning towards their ideology score was confirmed by comparing the ideology and authoritarianism effects in planned comparisons. In the LWA condition, the ideological incongruent conservative left-wing authoritarians were significantly less categorically liberal than liberals also high in LWA ($t[1576] = -63.90, p < .001$; Cohen's $d = -4.44, LCI = -4.64; UCI = -4.24$). They were also significantly more categorically liberal than conservatives low in LWA ($t[1190] = 8.60, p < .001$; Cohen's $d = .62, LCI = .48, UCI = .77$). They showed a liberal categorical identification mean much lower than liberals low in LWA ($t[803] = -38.04, p < .001$; Cohen's $d = -2.91, LCI = -3.18; UCI = -2.74$).

In the RWA condition, incongruent liberal right-wing authoritarians were statistically significantly greater on conservative categorization than their liberal low-RWA counterparts ($t[2004] = 10.74, p < .001$; Cohen's $d = .56, LCI = .46, UCI = .66$). Interestingly, they were also significantly less categorically liberal than conservative persons high in RWA ($t[604] = -31.90, p < .001$; Cohen's $d = -3.24, LCI = -3.51, UCI = -2.978$) and conservatives low in RWA ($t[1465] = -60.19, p < .001$; Cohen's $d = -3.34, LCI = -3.50, UCI = -3.18$).

On balance, these results suggest that ideologically incongruent authoritarians do show some signs of probabilistically higher ideological ambivalence, in each case showing a significant likelihood of

being more identified with the opposing ideology than their low-authoritarian counterparts who share their ideology. This provides partial support for the ambivalence hypothesis. However, this support is not especially overwhelming; further results reveal that this ambivalence effect pales in comparison to the effect of their ideology (absolute ideology effect size d 's > 2.8, absolute authoritarianism effect size d 's < .63). Indeed, these results reveal that incongruent authoritarians, while showing signs of ambivalence, are by and large consistent in their reports of ideological leanings. Nevertheless, the differences in ideological ambivalence do provide reason to suspect that it could potentially mediate some of the other effects. We explore this hypothesis in more detail in mediational analyses below.

Religiosity. Descriptive results for religiosity can be seen in main text Table 3. We computed two two-way interactions for LWA and RWA effects separately. For LWA, these results revealed main effects of both LWA and political ideology (p 's < .001) and an interaction between LWA score and ideology ($F = 10.31, p < .001$). High LWA liberals and high LWA conservatives both showed less religiosity than their low LWA counterparts: But the drop was steeper for liberals than for conservatives.

For RWA, these results revealed main effects of both LWA and political ideology (p 's < .001), but no interaction between LWA score and ideology ($F = 1.80, p = .179$). High LWA liberals and high RWA conservatives both showed more religiosity than their low RWA counterparts, and this rise was roughly similar for both liberals and conservatives.

Support for Trump/Clinton in 2016 Election

We computed two two-way interactions for LWA and RWA effects separately. For LWA and Trump Support, these results revealed main effects of both LWA and political ideology, as well as an interaction between LWA and ideology (all p 's < .001). Similarly, for RWA and Trump Support, results revealed main effects for ideology ($p < .001$) and RWA ($p = .005$), as well as an interaction between RWA and ideology ($p = .003$). These results were largely mirrored by support for Clinton. For LWA and Clinton

Support, results revealed a main effect for both ideology and LWA (p 's < .001), although the interaction between LWA score and ideology did not reach statistical significance ($p = .093$). For RWA, main effects emerged for ideology and RWA score (p 's < .001), and the interaction between RWA and ideology was statistically significant ($p = .010$).

These results reveal a clear pattern: Ideologically incongruent conservative left-wing authoritarians show less support for Trump than their low-LWA conservative counterparts, but far more support for Trump than their High-LWA liberal counterparts. This effect is mirrored almost exactly by the RWA results: Ideologically incongruent liberal right-wing authoritarians were more likely to vote for Trump than their low-RWA liberal counterparts, but they are still far less likely than both categories of conservative counterparts. The effect for RWA is bigger for liberals than conservatives, mirroring the effect for LWA in reverse. (Results are conceptually identical for Clinton.)

Threat

Geographical Ecological Stress. We computed two two-way interactions for LWA and RWA effects separately. For LWA, these results revealed main effects of both LWA and political ideology, as well as an interaction between LWA and ideology (all p 's < .001). For RWA, results revealed a main effect for authoritarianism ($p < .001$), a marginal main effect for ideology ($p = .076$), and no interaction ($p = .197$).

Perceived Covid Threat. We computed two two-way interactions for LWA and RWA effects separately. For LWA, these results revealed main effects of both LWA (authoritarians higher) and political ideology (liberals higher; p 's < .007), but no interaction between LWA and ideology ($p = .317$). For RWA, results revealed a main effect for ideology (liberals higher; $p < .001$), no main effect for RWA ($p = .466$), and a significant interaction ($p = .042$). The nature of this interaction shows that whereas incongruent liberals viewed COVID as less dangerous than low-RWA liberals, high-RWA conservatives viewed COVID

as more dangerous than low-RWA conservatives. However, this result appears more driven by low scores for low-RWA conservatives than the other cells.

Belief in a Dangerous World. We computed two two-way interactions for LWA and RWA effects separately, using the BDWC and BDWL as DVs in separate analyses. For BDWC as the DV, LWA analyses revealed a main effects for political ideology (liberals higher; $p = .008$), but no main effect of authoritarianism and no interaction between LWA and ideology (p 's $> .229$). For RWA, BDWC results revealed a main effect for authoritarianism ideology (authoritarians higher; $p < .001$), but no main effect for ideology nor a significant interaction (p 's $> .168$).

For BDWL as the DV, LWA analyses revealed no main effects or interactions (p 's $> .194$). For RWA, BDWC results revealed a main effect for authoritarianism ideology (authoritarians higher; $p = .035$), a marginal main effect for ideology (liberals higher; $p = .065$), and an interaction between the two ($p < .001$).

Outgroup Negativity

We computed two two-way interactions for LWA and RWA effects separately. For LWA, these results revealed main effects of both LWA (authoritarians higher) and political ideology (liberals higher; p 's $< .001$), but no interaction between LWA and ideology ($p = .518$). For RWA, results revealed main effects for ideology (conservatives higher; $p = .029$) and RWA (authoritarians higher $p < .001$), and no significant interaction ($p = .125$).

Self-Identification as "Authoritarian"

We computed two two-way interactions for LWA and RWA effects separately. For LWA, these results revealed main effects of both LWA (authoritarians higher) and political ideology (conservatives higher; p 's $< .001$), and an interaction between LWA and ideology ($p < .001$). Descriptive results showed

that, whereas liberals high in LWA showed less authoritarian self-identification (consistent with past work on liberals; Conway et al., 2021), conservatives high in LWA actually showed an increase in authoritarian self-identification. This reveals that conservatives high in LWA are aware of the shift to authoritarianism, but liberals are not. For RWA, results revealed main effects for ideology (conservatives higher) and RWA (authoritarians higher, both main effect p 's < .001), and no significant interaction ($p = .939$).

Summary Comparison of Authoritarianism and Ideology Effects: Additional Discussion

To get a bigger picture understanding of our data, we further compared the expected effects of authoritarianism and ideology against the reality of ideologically incongruent authoritarians for liberal and conservative incongruent authoritarians separately. To do this, we focused on comparing ideologically incongruent authoritarians to their two focal counterpart groups – those who shared their ideology but were lower in authoritarianism, and those who were similarly high in authoritarianism but differed in ideology.

For ease of comparison, when necessary, we reverse-scored effects in Table 6 when the expected effect direction was negative (e.g., liberals voting for Trump). To do this, we laid out the direction of the expected effect for both ideology and each kind of authoritarianism (LWA and RWA) separately (see Table 5). For example, for “Religion,” we expect that high-LWA would be associated with less religion, high-RWA would be associated with more religion, and ideological conservatism would be associated with more religion (and liberalism with less). For geographical ecological stress, however, we expect that both high-LWA and high-RWA would be associated with increased stress, while ideology would be largely unrelated. In most cases, these decisions are very straightforward, based on prior data and/or theorizing (e.g., it is uncontroversial to expect that those high in RWA and conservatives would be more likely to vote for Trump, while those high in LWA and liberals would be less likely). Two exceptions are worth

noting. The most interesting exception to this rule involves self-reported identification as authoritarian. Conceptually, we would expect that both left- and right-wing authoritarians would recognize that they are authoritarian. However, empirically, prior data reveals that left-wing authoritarians are actually *less* likely to self-identify as authoritarian (Conway et al., 2021). In this case, we erred on the side that made for the easiest interpretation – the conceptual side – since in some sense, left-wing authoritarians *should* likely self-identify as authoritarian (and as can be seen in the Table, high-LWA conservatives DO so identify). However, considering this expectation in the other (empirically-derived) direction does not change the general tenor of our results. Secondly, we considered the expectation for conservatives and liberals on “negative outgroup perception” as “equal” because the designs used here partially balanced out across outgroups that these groups disliked. However, the reality is more complicated than this summative statement, because we expect conservatives to dislike certain groups more than liberals (and vice versa). This was a consequence of trying to get a summary score.

It is worth noting that the specific direction assigned to the prediction does not change the strength of the effects – only their expected direction. We could have instead merely used the absolute value to compare effect sizes, and in fact, in all but two cases, this method would have yielded identical signs (as can be seen in Table 6, all but two of the signs for expected effects is positive, and one of the negative effects is nearly zero). The larger point is about the relative weight of the effects presented, and not about the specific expected effects. It is, however, useful for summary purposes to reverse-score effects where a negative effect is expected, for ease of comparison.